d. To the Fourth Argument

93. As to the fourth argument, when it is said that ‘the relative is not cause of its correlative’ [n.24], this is against the common opinion, unless perhaps one posits the persons to be absolutes; for if all Catholics concede origin in divine reality, they also concede that there person is principle to person. Or one must say that the relative is principle of its correlative. Or one must say that the person that is a principle is an absolute by relation to a second person.

94. The response then is, as I said in Ord. 1 d.28 n.24, that although relatives are simultaneous in nature, to the extent that ‘simultaneity’ states ‘not being able to be without each other’, yet priority or origin stands along with this, and priority of origin states nothing other than ‘from which’ another is.

95. On the contrary:

Things can have an order in the intellect that yet can have no order outside the intellect;     therefore things that can have no order in the intellect can have no order at all. But relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore etc     .

96. Again, what is simultaneous is, as simultaneous, not prior; but what is prior in origin, as it is prior in origin, is simultaneous with the posterior as it is posterior, because thus they are per se correlatives; therefore ‘prior in origin’ is not prior (and the same argument could be made about prior and posterior in nature).

97. To the first [n.95] I say that ‘being simultaneous in the intellect’ can be understood in two ways: either that the simultaneity determines the act of understanding as it considers the objects, or that it determines the objects themselves that are understood; or in another way (and it amounts to the same) simultaneity can state the mode of the objects as they are understood or compared to the act of understanding, or it can state the mode of the objects in themselves. In the first way the major is false, namely ‘things that are simultaneous in the intellect can have no order [sc. outside the intellect]’, because however much they have to be understood together, yet not for this reason is anything taken from them that belongs to them in themselves - and only in this way is the minor true.

98. On the contrary: relatives, in the way they are understood in their proper ideas, have complete simultaneity in the intellect; therefore they have no order.

99. I reply: their ideas do properly have a certain order, and yet they have simultaneity too as they have order, namely simultaneity in reference to the act of understanding.

100. To the second [n.96]: the major proposition, ‘things that are simultaneous do not, as simultaneous, have an order,’ is true if the ‘as’ states simultaneity and states it in the mode of simultaneity and, together with this, states it in the mode of order and in the mode of inherence of simultaneity and order. I understand it thus, that just as the mode of simultaneity is taken according to nature and according to order, so, proportionally, is the same mode of priority and posteriority taken; along with this too, that as simultaneity is predicated of them so order is denied of them, namely, that if ‘simultaneity’ is there taken as inhering in them denominatively, and if thereby order is not denied to be in them per se, in the first mode of per se, but is denied to be present in them denominatively, then the minor premise is only true of the mode ‘simultaneous in nature’ and of the mode of accidental or denominative inherence. And I conclude uniformly that they are not ordered by such order, and that as denominated by such order. But it does not follow from this that they are not ordered per se in the first mode. So this proposition is true, ‘the prior, as prior, is prior to the posterior’, understanding it of predication per se in the first mode; and this proposition is true, ‘the prior as prior is simultaneous with the posterior’, understanding this of predication per se in the second mode.

101. Nor is it unacceptable that in such general intentions one opposite is predicated essentially of the other, and that the other opposite is predicated of the same denominatively, understanding by ‘opposite’ what is opposite in idea of concept; but not every idea of opposition, as it is a mode of predication in different form, is preserved. -An example: power is power per se in the first mode, and power is in act by the actuality corresponding to it, because power, when outside its cause, is not in potency to its being. The thing is more apparent in intentions, because this proposition is true, ‘a singular is singular per se in the first mode’, and this one is true, ‘a singular is universal by denominative predication’; and in grammatical intentions the proposition, ‘masculine is masculine’, is true per se in the first mode - but this proposition ‘masculine is neuter’ [sc. the word ‘masculine’ is neuter in grammatical gender] is true denominatively or by denominative predication.